



# Two Years of War in Sudan

The Political, Economic, and  
Social Dimensions and Their  
Impact on Human Rights



## **Table of Contents**

<b>1. Introduction</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>2. Methodology</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>3. The Military and Political Escalation That Led Sudan into War</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>4. Conflict Analysis: Dynamics of the War and Areas of Control (April 2023 – February 2025)</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>4.1 Overview</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>4.2 Classification of Violent events</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>4.3 States with Most Security Events</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>4.4 Analysis of Shifting Battlefronts and Areas of Control Over the Past Two Years</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>4.4.1 Period from April 15 to December 2023</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>4.4.2 Period from January to December 2024</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>4.4.3 Period from January to February 2025</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>5. Political positions on the conflict</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>6. International and regional efforts to end the war in Sudan: challenges and stalled initiatives</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>6.1 UN and international efforts to end the war</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>6.2 Regional efforts to stop the conflict</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>6.3 The Jeddah platform and stalled initiatives</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>6.4 Alternative American and Turkish efforts</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>6.5 Limited inclusion of civilians and lack of effective pressure mechanisms</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>7. Impacts of the Conflict on the Economy: Monitoring Inflation, Money Supply, and Exchange Rate Indicators During 2023</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>7.1 Inflation and Rising Prices</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>7.2 Expansion of the Money Supply</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>7.3 Deterioration of the Exchange Rate</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>8. Violence and Human Rights Violations in Darfur</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>9. Humanitarian Situation and Healthcare</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>10. Recommendations</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>11. Conclusion</b>	<b>22</b>

# **Sudan Rights Watch Network & Insights**

## **1. Introduction**

Since gaining independence in 1956, Sudan has witnessed a series of armed conflicts and civil wars that have shaped its modern history. The first of these wars broke out in 1955, just months before independence, when the Equatoria Battalion in the South rebelled, sparking a civil war that lasted 17 years. This was followed by the second civil war in the South in 1983, which continued until the signing of the Naivasha Peace Agreement in 2005, eventually leading to the secession of South Sudan in 2011. Meanwhile, conflict had already erupted in the Darfur region in 2003, adding another layer of complexity to Sudan's protracted crises.

Multiple peace agreements have failed to achieve sustainable peace, as the root causes of the conflicts remain unresolved, including the marginalization of peripheral regions, exclusion, weak balanced development, limited political participation, and competition over power and resources. After the December 2018 revolution that ousted the Bashir regime, Sudan entered a fragile transitional period that quickly collapsed due to conflicts between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on one hand, and between military and civilian factions within the government on the other. This ultimately led to the outbreak of a new war on April 15, 2023.

The eruption of armed conflict on April 15, 2023, between SAF and RSF plunged the country into an unprecedented stage of security, political, and social deterioration. This has resulted in a comprehensive crisis, where humanitarian suffering intersects with institutional collapse, producing catastrophic consequences across all aspects of life. The conflict has reached horrifying levels of systematic violence and widespread human rights violations, especially in Darfur region, which over past decades has endured repeated cycles of armed conflict, forced displacement, and impunity.

## **2. Methodology**

This report is divided into two interrelated parts that together examine the factors behind the April 15 conflict in Sudan, exploring its political, economic, and social dimensions and its humanitarian and security consequences particularly in the hardest-hit regions such as Darfur, Kordofan, Central Sudan, and parts of Eastern Sudan.

The first part addresses the political, economic, and social aspects of the conflict by analyzing the dynamics and interests of key actors, reviewing the conflict's structure and its

evolution, and examining changes in territorial control and their impacts on local communities. This section was prepared by [Insights](#) through qualitative analysis based on multi-source data, aiming to understand the structural context that produced this level of violence and contributed to its prolongation. It also discusses the international and regional efforts to end the war in Sudan and the challenges that have hindered various initiatives — from the Jeddah platform, which saw serious attempts to de-escalate the conflict, to regional negotiations in Cairo and Juba, and the role played by the United Nations and the broader international community.

The second part was prepared by the [Sudan Human Rights Monitoring Network](#) and focuses on documenting grave human rights violations and security events in the Darfur region, using precise and systematic analysis. The acts of violence covered include extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detention, torture, sexual violence, starvation, forced displacement, and deliberate and indiscriminate targeting of civilian objects including health facilities, markets, and internally displaced persons (IDP) camps as well as attacks on civilians based on regional, ethnic, or political affiliation. This part relies on periodic field reports issued by the [Human Rights Network](#) during the period from October 2024 to March 2025, providing an accurate database that highlights the scale of the ongoing humanitarian catastrophe in the region resulting from the armed conflict that began on April 15.

Overall, the report aims to shed light through a comprehensive analytical and systematic approach—on the scale and depth of the interplay between political and economic factors and the systematic human rights violations. It also seeks to support accountability efforts to achieve justice, both in the short and long term, and to advocate for the protection of civilians and an end to the state of impunity that encourages the repetition of crimes and the practice of violence in all its forms and at all levels.

### **3. The Military and Political Escalation That Led Sudan into War**

The war that broke out on April 15, 2023, was the result of an accumulation of political, military, and economic factors rooted in the period following the overthrow of Omar al-Bashir's regime in April 2019. After Bashir's fall, a Transitional Military Council was formed, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, with the deputy position held by the commander of the RSF, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (commonly known as Hemedti). This came amid widespread popular demands for a successful democratic transition and the transfer of power fully to civilian leadership. These pressures led to the formation of a transitional government based on a partnership between the military council and civilian forces. However, tensions soon began to surface between military and civilian components,

alongside deep-rooted divisions within the military establishment itself between SAF and RSF.

During the transitional period, RSF's influence and power expanded significantly, especially in the Darfur region, where Hemedti worked to consolidate his presence by building tribal alliances and strengthening his military and political foothold. United Nations reports warned about the dangers of this expansion, noting that Hemedti's rhetoric emphasizing "Darfurian interests" in contrast to the "Northern elite" could have destabilizing effects. In response, voices within SAF increasingly opposed the RSF's status as a separate force and demanded its integration into SAF, a move Hemedti firmly rejected, insisting that his forces were "not just a battalion that could be easily integrated."

The crisis sharply escalated in September 2021 with a failed coup attempt led by General Abdel Bagi Bakrawi, who was known for his staunch opposition to the RSF. Then came the pivotal turning point on October 25, 2021, when Burhan, with Hemedti's participation, carried out a coup that dissolved the transitional government and detained its prime minister, Abdalla Hamdok, along with many civilian leaders. Although Hamdok later returned under an agreement in November 2021, the political crisis deepened, and he eventually resigned in January 2022 amid growing protests and violence.

In December 2022, some political forces signed what became known as the "Framework Agreement" with the military component, which was intended to pave the way for a new transitional period. However, this agreement faltered due to several factors, chief among them SAF's refusal to proceed with any political settlement before resolving the issue of forming a single professional SAF under unified command. The civilian forces themselves were also divided between supporters and opponents of the agreement. Meanwhile, increasingly public disagreements emerged between Burhan and Hemedti, especially after Hemedti declared in August 2022 that he "reject any attempt to dismantle the RSF" and described his participation in the October coup as "a mistake."

In February 2023, Hemedti visited Russia, raising questions about his ties to [Russian interests](#), especially amid reports of his involvement in the illicit export of Sudanese gold. Tensions escalated further with reports that the RSF had received funding from Emirati companies. The crisis reached its peak in April 2023, as military sensitivity intensified between SAF and RSF, with SAF accusing the RSF of unlawfully deploying its forces near strategic sites such as Merowe Airport and its adjacent airbase. On April 15, 2023, these tensions erupted into open armed clashes in the capital, Khartoum, which quickly spread to other states and major cities, including Nyala, the capital of South Darfur State. Subsequent mediation attempts by some civilian forces and leaders of armed movements failed to halt the conflict.

## 4. Conflict Analysis: Dynamics of the War and Areas of Control (April 2023 – February 2025)

### 4.1 Overview

Since the outbreak of the war, Insights has documented 6,781 events of violence resulting in 13,364 victims across various states of Sudan. Figure (1) illustrates the continued escalation in the number of violent events and accidents, with 2024 witnessing a significant increase compared to 2023. Meanwhile, data from the first months of 2025 show that this trend has persisted, with January and February recording high rates exceeding the average.





Figure 1: Trend of Violent events and Casualties in Sudan (April 2023 – February 2025)

### 4.2 Classification of Violent events

The events documented by Insights varied and included armed clashes, air attacks and explosions, violence against civilians, violence against the state, and state procedures. Figure (2) shows that air attacks and explosions were the most frequent type of incident, followed by events of violence against civilians and then armed clashes. Although violence against civilians was not the most frequent category, it resulted in by far the highest number of casualties.



**Figure 2: Classification of Documented Violent events During the Conflict**

### 4.3 States with Most Security Events

Figure (3) shows the distribution of violent events across Sudan's 18 states during the period from April 2023 to February 2025. Khartoum State recorded the highest number of documented events, with 2,756 events, followed by aj-Jazira State with 1,251 events, and North Darfur State with 921 events. This reflects the intensity of the conflict in these areas, which have witnessed major battles and large-scale displacement.






Figure 3: Geographic Distribution of Violent events by State (April 2023 – February 2025)

#### 4.4 Analysis of Shifting Battlefronts and Areas of Control Over the Past Two Years

##### 4.4.1 Period from April 15 to December 2023

The war effectively began in Khartoum, although its first spark ignited in Merowe, located in the Northern State. During the first month, the clashes were largely concentrated in Khartoum, with limited movements by RSF in South, North, and West Darfur states, as well



as in areas adjacent to aj-Jazirah State. However, these movements did not escalate into major battles at that stage.

In Khartoum, the RSF managed to seize large parts of the city during the first months of the war, while SAF retained positions in some neighborhoods, particularly in Karari locality, alongside key [strategic military sites](#). These included the General Command Headquarters, Wadi Seidna Airbase, the Engineers Corps, the Armored Corps, and the Signal Corps.

Over time, the RSF expanded its operations in Darfur region, directly targeting SAF positions. The city of Nyala in South Darfur witnessed repeated clashes, ultimately resulting in [RSF control in October 2023](#). This was followed by the RSF's entry into [Ag-Geneina in November](#), which led to full control over West Darfur State. By the end of 2023, four out of the five Darfur states had come under RSF control, except for North Darfur, where the city of al-Fasher remained under SAF control due to the role played by the Joint Force affiliated with allied armed movements.

In Kordofan states, SAF maintained control over al-Obeid despite repeated attacks and succeeded [in retaking Dilling](#). Meanwhile, the RSF tightened its grip on the cities of ar-Rahad and Um Rawaba in North Kordofan, in addition to most of [West Kordofan](#) except for Babnousa. In aj-Jazirah State, the RSF began its movements in late 2023, but the most significant event was the [fall of Wad Madani](#) on December 18, which turned the state into a new arena of conflict in the following year.

#### **4.4.2 Period from January to December 2024**

After the fall of Wad Madani, the RSF continued their advance across aj-Jazirah State, seizing control of most of its cities and villages during the early months of 2024. However, by mid-year, their progress began to slow gradually due to the emergence of popular resistance in some areas. Unlike its tactics in other regions, the RSF employed an exceptionally high level of violence in aj-Jazirah State, committing grave violations against civilians. The most notable incident was the attack on the village of Wad an-Noura in southern aj-Jazirah on June 5, which left over 100 civilian casualties, according to local and international reports.

Initially, East aj-Jazirah locality remained relatively untouched by these violations, but the situation changed following the defection of Abu Aqla Kaikil and his forces to SAF. This prompted the RSF to launch a new wave of violence in the area, most notably the attack on the village of as-Sereihah in East Al Jazirah on October 25, which resulted in 140 civilian casualties.

In Khartoum, SAF maintained its main positions and achieved significant progress in Omdurman, recapturing the Radio and Television Headquarters in February 2024, ending nearly a year of RSF control over the site. SAF also partially lifted the siege on Omdurman,

which allowed it to reorganize its forces. As the year progressed, it regained some areas in Khartoum and Bahri, and by the last quarter, it advanced from Omdurman toward Khartoum, crossing the White Nile Bridge into the al-Mogran area in central Khartoum. Despite these advances, the RSF retained control over several key strategic sites, including the aj-Jaili Refinery, the Presidential Palace, Khartoum International Airport, and the Central Bank of Sudan.

In Darfur, the RSF maintained full control over the region—except for North Darfur, which remained outside its grasp. Throughout 2024, SAF intensified its air attacks targeting RSF positions and military centers across the region. al-Fasher witnessed the fiercest battles, as the RSF attempted to storm it but faced fierce resistance from SAF and the joint forces of Darfur’s allied armed movements.

In the Blue Nile region, the RSF began its movements toward the area late in the year, leading to clashes in at-Tadamon locality during December. In Sennar, SAF regained control of Jabal Muya area on October 5, then continued its advance toward Sennar’s capital, Singa, which it retook on November 23 after fierce fighting with the RSF. On September 26, SAF launched one of its largest offensive operations, advancing from the Wadi Seidna and Engineers Corps bases, breaking through Khartoum and Bahri localities from Omdurman. This maneuver connected al-Kadro camp in northern Bahri to Wadi Seidna.

#### **4.4.3 Period from January to February 2025**

At the start of January 2025, SAF launched a simultaneous offensive from several axes to retake control of Wad Madani. The maneuvers advanced from the areas of al-Managil in western aj-Jazirah State, Sennar, and al-Qadarif. After intense clashes, these forces reached the outskirts of the city, and by securing ash-Shabaraqa on January 9, the road to Wad Madani was opened. SAF officially announced its recapture of the city on January 11.

In parallel with these operations, SAF also launched an offensive in Bahri to break the siege on the Signal Corps camp. Its forces advanced from the north of the city, coordinated with an attack by the besieged forces inside the camp. After battles that continued until January 25, SAF succeeded in lifting the siege on the Signal Corps and the General Command Headquarters, ending an isolation that had lasted since April 2023. With this, it achieved one of the main objectives of “Operation 26 September” linking most of its major bases in Khartoum, except for the Armored Corps.

Another significant operation took place in northern Khartoum during this period, where SAF regained control of the aj-Jaili Refinery after a two-pronged attack: forces advanced northward from Kadro, while other forces moved southward from Shendi. On January 25, after tightening the siege, SAF declared full control over the refinery, ending the RSF’s

presence in River Nile State and opening a strategic supply line to Khartoum. In North Kordofan, SAF made significant progress through the “as-Sayyad” mobile force, which, after previous attempts, succeeded in capturing Um Rawaba, paving the way to later seize the city of ar-Rahad and bringing it closer to lifting the siege on al-Obeid.

By February 2025, SAF continued expanding its operations in Bahri. After breaking the siege on the Signal Corps, it took control of Kober neighborhood and the bridge linking Khartoum and Bahri. Its forces then advanced into Kafouri area, capturing the RSF headquarters there, which forced RSF units stationed east of the Nile to retreat. Taking advantage of this withdrawal, SAF launched an attack toward al-Isaelat and Um Duwan Ban, supported by Abu Aqla Kaikil’s forces “Sudan’s Shield” and succeeded in lifting the siege on the Engineers Corps base in the area after 14 months of isolation.

In the northern part of East Nile, SAF advanced toward Ed Babiker, forcing RSF to withdraw to al-Haj Yousif. At the same time, forces coming from Bahri seized Hillat Kuku’s market, bringing SAF to within just 2.5 kilometers of al-Manshiyya Bridge, further tightening the noose around RSF positions in the area.

In Kordofan, the “al-Sayyad” mobile force continued its advance by seizing ar-Rahad, which later allowed it to break the siege of al-Obeid after linking up with the Hajjana Corps forces stationed inside the city and SAF’s camps in White Nile State thus ending a blockade that had lasted 22 months.

In South Kordofan, SAF advanced from Kadugli, taking control of al-Kuwaik and ad-Dashoul, where it seized a camp belonging to the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). Later, it captured the al-Kargul camp, the largest SPLM camp between Dilling and Kadugli in a move aimed at securing the area and lifting the siege on Dilling.

In aj-Jazirah State, SAF built on its success in Wad Madani to push further north, capturing Wadi Sha’ir, the RSF’s last defensive line before al-Hasahisa, which it recaptured within a single day. It also advanced in East aj-Jazirah locality, seizing control of Tamboul, Rufaa, al-Hilaliya, and Wad Rawah, thereby tightening its grip over the entire locality and strengthening its presence in one of Sudan’s most important agricultural and strategic areas.

## **5. Political positions on the conflict**

The period following April 15 witnessed wide political shifts and divergent stances from various actors; these ranged between support for one of the warring parties, neutrality, or calls for a ceasefire and a peaceful resolution. The period also saw notable changes in positions and alliances among different entities.

The Sudanese [National Congress Party](#), alongside other parties, declared explicit support for SAF from the outset of the war. Meanwhile, the Forces of Freedom and Change – Central Council, together with other parties including the [Communist Party](#), chose to remain neutral and called for an end to violence and for reaching a [peaceful solution through negotiation](#).

As the war developed, the parties of the “Central Council,” along with professional groups, civil society organizations, and other bodies, formed the [Democratic Civil Forces Coordination \(Taqaddum\)](#) alliance, which rejected the war in Sudan. In January 2024, this alliance [signed a Declaration of Principles with the RSF in Addis Ababa](#), in which the RSF expressed its willingness to immediately and unconditionally cease hostilities through direct negotiations with SAF. The alliance’s leader, Abdullah Hamdok, also met with Abdel Aziz al-Hilu, leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North, and Abdel Wahid Mohamed Nour, leader of the Sudan Liberation Movement/SAF, in Nairobi, where they reached agreements on several issues, most notably ending the [war and the principle of secularism](#).

On February 22, 2025, a group of political forces affiliated with Taqaddum, along with al-Hilu’s wing of the SPLM, announced the establishment of the Founding Sudan Alliance (“Tasis”), which [supported the formation of a government in RSF-controlled areas](#). Other entities formed the [Civil Democratic Alliance of Revolutionary Forces \(“Sumood”\)](#), which opposed the formation of such a government and called for remaining equally distant from both SAF and the RSF effectively marking the official end of the Taqaddum alliance.

The positions of the armed movements that signed the Juba Peace Agreement varied between neutrality and open support for one of the warring parties. From the beginning of the war, [Malik Agar’s wing of the SPLM-North declared its support for SAF, and Agar was appointed as Deputy Chairman of the Sovereign Council](#) one month after the outbreak of war. In contrast, Minni Arko Minawi, leader of the Sudan Liberation Movement, and Jibril Ibrahim, leader of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), initially maintained neutrality and [called for a peaceful solution before declaring support for SAF against the RSF in November 2023](#). Internal disagreements over JEM’s position led to a split [into two wings](#): one supporting SAF, led by Jibril Ibrahim, and another rejecting the war and advocating for a peaceful solution, [led by Suleiman Sanda, the political secretary of the movement](#).

In parallel, the Third Front Tamazuj was the only signatory armed movement that declared support for the RSF. Other non-signatory movements, such as Abu Aqla Kikel’s forces, supported the RSF at the beginning of the war before later shifting to [support SAF and fighting against the RSF](#).

## **6. International and regional efforts to end the war in Sudan: challenges and stalled initiatives**

### **6.1 UN and international efforts to end the war**

Even before the war broke out, external factors including the Trilateral Mechanism (the UN, the African Union, and IGAD) had been working to manage the tensions that were becoming clear after the signing of the Framework Agreement. By April 15, the war erupted following the failure of all de-escalation efforts, a pattern that continued throughout the conflict, with only the Jeddah platform and a secret meeting in Manama managing to bring both parties to the table.

Many countries and international bodies issued statements calling on the warring parties to cease fighting, protect civilians, and open safe corridors for civilians and diplomatic missions to leave Khartoum. The United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) whose mandate was ended by Security Council resolution 2715 also issued a [statement](#) urging an end to the fighting and calling to spare the country further violence.

UN efforts to restore stability in Sudan have been led by Ramtane Lamamra, acting as the [Personal Representative](#) of the Secretary-General. Lamamra has held dialogues with civilian and military actors and provided regular briefings to the Security Council. The Council held several sessions and adopted resolutions supporting UN efforts to engage with various parties and to advance the good offices mission to achieve peace in Sudan.

### **6.2 Regional efforts to stop the conflict**

Both Egypt and South Sudan made early attempts to help end the fighting that spread rapidly across the country. While Juba's efforts did not crystallize into a formal initiative, Cairo succeeded in hosting the Sudan [Neighboring Countries Summit](#) in July 2023, which sought ways to end the conflict, address its negative repercussions on neighboring countries, and establish effective mechanisms for a peaceful settlement.

The summit, however, produced limited concrete outcomes, despite forming a ministerial committee to follow up on its recommendations. Likewise, Egypt organized a [humanitarian conference](#) on Sudan in November 2023, aiming to create an open coordination platform among national and international aid initiatives and organizations. Perhaps Egypt's most notable achievement was hosting a conference of Sudanese political and civil forces, where participants agreed on the need for comprehensive reconciliation and an immediate ceasefire.

### **6.3 The Jeddah platform and stalled initiatives**

The various platforms calling for peace in Sudan lacked practical coordination, yet all emphasized the importance of the Jeddah platform, launched under Saudi American sponsorship in May 2023. The platform not only brought both sides to the negotiating table but also succeeded in securing a short-term ceasefire and a [written commitment](#) to protect civilians, among other terms included in the Jeddah Declaration of May 11, 2023.

In its second round, the Jeddah talks integrated the African Union and IGAD as part of the facilitation group. However, the Jeddah platform collapsed after the mediation announced the [suspension of talks](#) in December 2023 following SAF's withdrawal. IGAD's initiative faced a similar fate; it had formed a quartet committee (Kenya, Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Djibouti) tasked with facilitating a meeting between SAF and RSF leaders within ten days, arranging a humanitarian corridor within two weeks, and launching an inclusive political process.

### **6.4 Alternative American and Turkish efforts**

After the suspension of the Jeddah platform, the United States pursued a different path. Its envoy to Sudan, [Tom Perriello](#), consulted with most regional countries and several political and civil groups. These efforts led to talks in Geneva in August 2024, which SAF representatives did not attend. Participants included representatives from the United States, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, the African Union, and the UN, aiming to end the war, alleviate civilian suffering, and facilitate humanitarian aid delivery, with the RSF taking part.

International pressure helped [open the Adre border crossing](#) and established the “Allied Partners for Saving Lives and Securing Peace in Sudan” (ALPS) group. An enforcement framework was also developed to ensure compliance with the Jeddah Declaration and future agreements. Buoyed by his success in mediating between Somalia and Ethiopia, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan offered to mediate between [Sudan and the UAE](#) — a proposal accepted by both parties. Earlier, the Sudanese SAF had expressed willingness to enter indirect negotiations with the RSF under Libyan and Turkish mediation, following a UN Security Council resolution calling for an immediate cessation of violence; however, these talks quickly fell apart.

### **6.5 Limited inclusion of civilians and lack of effective pressure mechanisms**

Overall, the international initiatives and platforms focused on the warring parties and on facilitating humanitarian aid delivery, while the participation of civilian and political groups was limited to consultations before the Geneva talks and the attendance of Sudanese diaspora members as observers during the negotiations. The various initiatives also failed

to establish effective mechanisms to pressure the parties to implement the outcomes of the Jeddah Declaration, although some humanitarian aid delivery efforts did succeed.

## **7. Impacts of the Conflict on the Economy: Monitoring Inflation, Money Supply, and Exchange Rate Indicators During 2023**

The Central Bank of Sudan issued a report titled “*Developments in the Sudanese Economy in 2023*”, which addressed the direct impact of the war on economic performance. The report focused on several key areas, from which we highlight three indicators that reflect the most prominent signs of economic deterioration: inflation, money supply, and the exchange rate.

### **7.1 Inflation and Rising Prices**

The overall inflation rate rose from 87.3% at the end of 2022 to 92.7% by the end of 2023, with an average annual inflation rate of 66.6%. The report attributed this increase to several conflict-related factors, including:

- Declining production and disruptions to supply chains due to infrastructure collapse and the breakdown of transportation networks.
- Rising fuel prices and higher housing and transportation costs, driven by increasing internal displacement.
- Import difficulties, leading to shortages of goods and price increases.
- Increased government spending on war effort, contributing to an expansion of the money supply.
- The disruption of banking systems and financial infrastructure, such as the Electronic Banking Services (EBS) company, which affected the central bank's ability to implement monetary policy.

### **7.2 Expansion of the Money Supply**

The money supply, the total amount of currency available in the economy, including banknotes and bank deposits, experienced significant growth, reaching 54.2% by the end of 2023, exceeding the target rate of 28%. This growth was attributed to:



- A 94.7% increase in direct financing to the central government due to declining public revenues.
- Rising military expenditures, placing additional pressure on the banking system.
- A 60% increase in the monetary base (which includes total currency issued by the central bank and bank reserves), surpassing the target rate of 27%. This was due to government borrowing from the banking system and the depreciation of the Sudanese pound.

### **7.3 Deterioration of the Exchange Rate**

In 2021, the government adopted a unified exchange rate policy as part of an economic reform program, which helped narrow the gap between the official and parallel markets. However, in March 2022, it moved to a fully liberalized exchange rate regime, where the rate was determined solely by supply and demand, without central bank intervention.

By the end of 2023, the Sudanese pound had depreciated against the US dollar from SDG 578.17 to SDG 998.11 — a drop of 72.6%. A sharp decline in purchases and sales at banks and exchange companies was also observed. The Central Bank of Sudan identified the following reasons for this deterioration:

8. The suspension of operations at banks and exchange companies in Khartoum and several states.
9. A decline in exports and weak repatriation of export earnings.
10. The suspension of official remittances from expatriates, boosting activity in the parallel market.
11. Increased demand for foreign currency by displaced people and expatriates to send money abroad.

## **8. Violence and Human Rights Violations in Darfur**

Since the outbreak of the conflict on April 15, 2023, human rights in Sudan have come under the most widespread and deliberate wave of violations in over a decade—both in terms of the diversity of abuses, their frequency, and the depth of their impact on the vast majority of

the Sudanese population. These violations have spread across much of the country, with only a few states and regions spared.

The regions of Darfur and Kordofan, along with central states and Khartoum, have been the hardest hit, both quantitatively and qualitatively. According to the [Sudan Human Rights Monitoring Network](#), over 850 violations had been documented by the end of March 2025. These include extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrest and detention, and torture. The latter was detailed in an investigative report by the Network titled: “[Screams Behind the Walls Torture Violations Against Civilians During the April 15 War Darfur Sudan](#)”.

The security situation in Darfur has progressively deteriorated due to the ongoing conflict. As hostilities intensified, grave human rights violations were committed, including direct attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, in clear violation of international humanitarian law — notably the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977. This has been compounded by weaknesses in Sudanese legal frameworks — including the Interim Constitution and the Penal Code — which have failed to protect and enforce human rights or ensure justice, both in peacetime and during internal or regional armed conflicts. The absence of enforcement has opened the door for widespread impunity and the continuation and escalation of violence.

According to reports issued by the *Sudan Human Rights Monitoring Network* between October 2024 and March 2025 — based on advanced documentation methodologies and field monitoring by observers stationed across Sudan and the region — all five Darfur states witnessed serious human rights abuses against civilians. These included: extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detention, abduction, torture, systematic starvation, obstruction and looting of medical teams, commercial convoys, and humanitarian aid, as well as indiscriminate attacks on civilian infrastructure, sexual violence, and violations based on gender, ethnicity, regional affiliation, and identity. The abuses also involved looting, intimidation, theft, property destruction, forced recruitment, and child abduction.

Many of the civilian casualties resulted from military operations carried out indiscriminately, deliberately, or both — including artillery shelling by the RSF, airstrikes by the army, and direct clashes between the two forces prior to the army’s withdrawal from West, South, Central, and East Darfur in late 2023.

Under international humanitarian law, these abuses constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity. Some, such as the level of violence witnessed in ag-Geneina and parts of Al Jazirah State, may amount to acts of genocide. Most violations repeatedly targeted civilians and civilian facilities, worsening the humanitarian crisis and intensifying the

deteriorating security situation in the region, which continues to see large-scale displacement and refugee flows to neighboring countries such as Chad, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, Libya, and Uganda.

The Network's reports from [October](#) and [November 2024](#) documented a sharp increase in violations, including extrajudicial killings and indiscriminate attacks on populated civilian areas and infrastructure — whether through RSF artillery or army airstrikes. Other violations recorded included forced recruitment, civilian intimidation through random gunfire and verbal threats — especially in areas under full RSF control in Darfur.

The [December 2024 report](#) indicated a continued escalation in violations, showing a pattern of repeated targeting of residential neighborhoods, IDP camps, markets, and healthcare facilities — including the Saudi Hospital in al-Fasher — by the RSF through almost daily shelling of civilian areas. The report also documented widespread violations by the army's air force, exacerbating the region's fragile security and humanitarian conditions.

The report further highlighted that areas under RSF control suffer from extreme insecurity, characterized by widespread extrajudicial killings, armed looting, threats, abductions, arbitrary arrests, restrictions on freedoms, and the spread of hate speech. Recurrent armed clashes between herders and farmers were also recorded.

At the beginning of 2025, the Network's [January report](#) documented a broad continuation and increase in violations and security events. These included artillery and air strikes deliberately and indiscriminately targeting civilians and vital facilities — particularly health centers, markets, and schools. The report noted a rise in legal violations such as killings, armed threats, looting, home invasions, as well as intimidation and physical and sexual assaults. Roadblocks that disrupted economic activity and targeted medical workers, clergy, and youth were also documented.

The report also noted deliberate targeting of displaced people in camps and shelters. The ongoing conflict has led to a catastrophic worsening of humanitarian and health conditions. The crisis was further exacerbated by the U.S. suspension of its humanitarian response funding to Sudan in late January — a program estimated at around \$800 million for 2024. Emergency response groups that previously provided essential food and medical support to affected populations — especially in displacement areas — have collapsed.

The Network's February and March 2025 reports documented a significant surge in human rights violations amid worsening security caused by the ongoing conflict. There was an increase in military attacks on civilians and residential areas by the RSF, alongside continued army airstrikes. The reports also noted a rise in conflict-related security events,

such as explosive device detonations in markets, rising killings, armed looting, ransom kidnappings, arbitrary arrests, sexual assaults, and growing threats.

The reports recorded the imposition of curfews, movement restrictions, bans on economic activities, military displays in urban centers, deployment of military hardware in residential areas, and the forced collection of money from residents. Collectively, these practices have contributed to a severe deterioration in security, humanitarian, and health conditions, deepening civilian suffering.

## **9. Humanitarian Situation and Healthcare**

Since the outbreak of war between the RSF and the SAF, essential infrastructure and services including drinking water, electricity, and markets have been severely affected. The healthcare system has been among the most impacted sectors, with its facilities, personnel, and operational systems subjected to attacks and violations that, under international humanitarian law, amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. This sharp deterioration in the healthcare system has had catastrophic consequences for civilians across all social and age groups.

According to human rights network reports, both indiscriminate and systematic military attacks on health institutions, including their occupation, looting, and conversion into military targets have caused major damage to the healthcare sector. Violations also included assaults on medical staff, obstruction of humanitarian aid delivery, prevention of emergency teams from performing their duties, and disruption of medicine and transportation equipment. These actions led to a halt or severe reduction in healthcare services at all levels, putting the lives of more than half the country's population, especially in the Darfur region, already experiencing fragile humanitarian conditions due to the density of displacement camps at risk of disease outbreaks, malnutrition, and famine. Famine was officially declared in Zamzam IDP camp in North Darfur following the deaths of several individuals, including women and children, due to hunger and malnutrition.

The Ministry of Health has estimated a need for around \$3 billion to provide an urgent response targeting 14 million people. It also emphasized the necessity for effective state-level ministries equipped with trained personnel and basic livelihood stability.

However, even prior to the war, Sudan's healthcare sector suffered from severe social and geographic inequalities. While the wealthy elite in the capital had access to healthcare services, most of the population found such services limited and inaccessible. With the outbreak of conflict, many vital institutions ceased operations. For instance, the Sudanese Childhood Diabetes Association was impacted, and the Mycetoma Research Center the

only specialized center for studying the disease shut down. Life-saving medications such as insulin were either spoiled, depleted, or deliberately destroyed.

The suffering of individuals with chronic illnesses, especially those requiring dialysis, has intensified. More than 8,000 patients were affected by power outages, resulting in fatalities and forcing others to shorten dialysis sessions. All dialysis centers across the country were impacted some ceased operations completely, while others suffered significant damage. Over 9,000 people in Sudan require dialysis, yet only three of eight cardiac treatment centers were operational by early 2024. The country also lost three oncology treatment centers, one of which served over 60% of cancer patients. Additionally, nearly 90% of pharmaceutical import companies were looted, and 27 medicine factories—all based in Khartoum—were destroyed and went out of service from the first day of the war.

The Health Protection Alliance documented 257 attacks on health facilities, including 56 killings of health workers, 63 facility destruction, 57 lootings of medical supplies, and 41 cases of facility occupation. Available medical supplies in the country are estimated to meet only about 25% of current needs, as the health system continues to face a sustained crisis in supply provision. According to the Alliance, only 8 states received supplies from partner organizations. Health ministries in Darfur reported receiving no central supplies over the past two years.

As a result, the targeting of infrastructure had catastrophic consequences on civilian life in Darfur. A research study by AWAIFY Organization, discussed in January 2025 under the title [“The Impact of the Collapse of Health Services on Civilian Life in Darfur \(April 15, 2023 – August 30, 2024\)”](#), found that more than 84% of the population had been affected by the collapse of healthcare services. The study revealed that over 59% of health centers were completely out of service and 41% partially disrupted due to repeated armed attacks, widespread looting, and infrastructure destruction such as what occurred with medical supplies in Nyala. The study also highlighted various violations against healthcare workers.

The study confirmed the shutdown of Nyala, Zalingei, ag-Geneina, and ad-Daein teaching hospitals, along with health insurance centers and private clinics, at different times due to either direct targeting or the consequences of military operations coinciding with RSF control over four of Darfur’s five states by late November 2023. This led to a "near-catastrophic" reduction in healthcare delivery exceeding 90%, given the large capacity of these main facilities.

Throughout the study period, 11 hospitals and health centers, as well as 12 medicine warehouses and stores, were targeted in Nyala alone. The system in West Darfur nearly completely collapsed, while more than 90% of 40 health facilities in Central Darfur were

affected. East Darfur's health system deteriorated by over 60%, and North Darfur witnessed a complete collapse of more than 95% of its healthcare infrastructure. Survey and interview data showed that RSF and its allied forces were responsible for over 72% of direct or indirect targeting of the health system, while SAF and affiliated parties accounted for more than 26%.

The study found that looting, theft, and deliberate vandalism of pharmacies and medical warehouses led to a severe shortage in medications at all levels exceeding 80%. Intensive care units, nutrition and immunization departments, surgical and emergency rooms, cardiac care, and dialysis units were heavily damaged, leaving patients with chronic diseases, pregnant women, and children severely affected. Mortality, injury, and disease rates rose by more than 75%, with new epidemics also emerging, including a widespread eye infection and rising malnutrition.

Civilians were forced to purchase medicine from the black market in over 44% of cases. Insecurity posed a barrier to accessing treatment in more than 90% of cases, leaving over 20% of the population without any form of healthcare. This contributed to a growing trend of resorting to herbal and traditional remedies, despite their known health risks, at rates exceeding 20%.

The collapse of the healthcare system and suspension of services also had profound psychological impacts. Over 56% of civilians reported psychological instability, while 25% experienced anxiety, and 19% suffered from depression and stress. These issues compounded pre-existing mental health conditions amid an almost complete absence of formal or community-based psychosocial support. The study further emphasized the sector's severe lack of sound health policies to mitigate civilian suffering during crises and emergencies.

According to [Insecurity Insight](#) reports covering the period from April 15, 2023, to August 30, 2024, Sudan's health system suffered 89 attacks and violations. This led to 152 deaths and 104 injuries. The violations included 62 attacks on health facilities, 24 on patients, 10 events involving the targeting of medicine transportation, 29 lootings of medical supplies, 41 assaults on healthcare workers, and 14 attacks on medical warehouses. Additionally, Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) recorded over 135 cases of sexual violence and gender-based violence between July and December 2023.

## **10. Recommendations**

Based on the above discussion and analysis, the report presents the following recommendations:

1. It is essential to identify and implement the best options and measures to ensure the protection of civilians and civilian infrastructure during both international and non-international armed conflicts, given the catastrophic consequences of such conflicts on all aspects of civilian life.
2. In the context of armed conflicts, decisive action must be taken against parties who violate international, regional, and national conventions, treaties, and agreements. It is crucial to enforce principles of proportionality, distinction, and other key rules of international humanitarian law.
3. There is a pressing need for urgent and strategic intervention to deliver humanitarian aid to civilians during armed conflicts, while ensuring the mobilization of adequate support and funding to rescue victims of targeting, violations, and violence.
4. Protection efforts must be scaled up for human rights defenders — including lawyers, journalists, activists, community leaders, and leaders in displacement camps. Adequate funding must be provided to support their ongoing work in documentation, monitoring, and reporting on human rights conditions amid violence.
5. All levels of pressure must be exerted to bring armed conflicts to an end as swiftly as possible, given their devastating and tragic impacts on civilians — particularly those already suffering the consequences of displacement and forced migration

## **11. Conclusion**

In summary, the war that erupted on April 15, 2023, in Sudan has had catastrophic consequences across all levels particularly humanitarian, political, economic, and social. This conflict has exposed the persistent power struggle between the warring parties and the resulting collapse of security and stability. While the war has caused devastating losses in lives and property, its most profound and lasting impact lies in the long-term harm that will affect Sudanese society for decades to come.

Through the analysis of ongoing violations against civilians committed by both SAF and RSF the report highlights that these violations are not limited to immediate damage. They also carry significant social, psychological, and economic consequences that will continue to manifest in the future. Perhaps most concerning is the severe deterioration of the social fabric, as relations between different social components have become increasingly strained



and complex due to the regional and communal divisions caused by the conflict. These tensions are expected to persist over time, underscoring the urgent need for in-depth studies to explore viable pathways toward reconciliation and social healing in the post-war period.

Economically, the war has resulted in an unprecedented collapse of infrastructure and the destruction of key economic sectors on which Sudan depends, such as agriculture and trade. The ramifications of this collapse are likely to be long-lasting, with the Sudanese economy facing enormous challenges in regaining stability. Unless immediate and strategic actions are taken to mitigate the negative effects on the local economy, reduce poverty, and address the rising unemployment caused by the war, these challenges will remain entrenched.

On the political front, the deterioration of governance remains a major challenge. The absence of an effective central government has created a vacuum in authority and leadership, allowing armed groups to proliferate and expand their influence. These political challenges will hinder the state's ability to rebuild institutions and restore security and stability soon.

Therefore, the need to study the long-term consequences of this war is more urgent than ever. While the immediate impacts are evident and catastrophic, the deeper, more enduring effects will continue to shape the lives of future generations. Expanding the analysis of the war and its implications for Sudan must become a central focus of any future response. A comprehensive approach is required, one that fosters a deep understanding of how to rebuild Sudanese society across social, economic, and political dimensions. Only through such an approach can the country overcome the devastation of war and ensure that such destructive experiences are not repeated in the future.